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Abstract. In 'Hard' science, scientists correctly operate as the 'guardians of certainty', using hypothesis testing formulations
and value judgements about error rates and time discounting that make classical inferential methods appropriate. But
these methods can neither generate most of the inputs needed by decision makers in their time frame, nor generate them
in a form that allows them to be integrated into the decision in an analytically coherent and transparent way. The need for
transparent accountability in public decision making under uncertainty and value conflict means the analytical coherence
provided by the stochastic Bayesian decision analytic approach, drawing on the outputs of Bayesian science, is needed. If
scientific researchers are to play the role they should be playing in informing value-based decision making, they need to
see themselves also as 'guardians of uncertainty', ensuring that the best possible eurrent posterior distributions on relevant
parameters are made available for decision making, irrespective of the state of the certainty-seeking research. The paper
distinguishes the actors employing different technologies in terms of the focus of the technology (knowledge, values,
choice); the 'home base' mode of their activity on the cognitive continuum of varying analysis-to-intuition ratios; and the
underlying value judgements of the activity (especially error loss functions and time discount rates). Those who propose
any principle of decision making other than the banal 'Best Principle', including the 'Precautionary Principle', are properly
interpreted as advocates seeking to have their own value judgements and preferences regarding mode location apply. The
task i^ or accountable decision makers, and their supporting technologists, is to determine the best course of action under
the universal conditions of uncertainty and value difference/conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
Scientific researchers are often tempted to collude with
policy makers' desire - reflecting the dreams of their
constituents - to be seen as offering 'science-based' de-
cisions and policies. However, value judgements are the
logically necessary basis for all decisions, so, irrespective
of the amount of certainty and uncertainty in the scientific
evidence, the most that scientists can do is inform value-
based decision making. Putting it this way is not intended
to diminish the vital importance of this role, but it is a
preliminary to arguing that, at the moment, scientists are
not performing this 'informing' task appropriately- or effi-
ciently, taking into account the societal resources involved
- and policy makers are not asking for it to be performed
appropriately. This reflects a long-standing and partly
self-serving confusion in both groups between the method-
ologies and criteria appropriate for knowledge generation
and evaluation on the one hand and for decision and policy
making on the other. In the former, scientists correctly
operate as the 'guardians of certainty', using hypothesis
testing formulations and value judgements about error
rates and time discounting that make classical inferential
methods entirely appropriate. But this approach and these
methods can neither generate most of the inputs needed
by decision makers in their time frame, nor generate them
in a form that allows them to be integrated into the deci-
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sion in an analytically coherent and transparent way. Both
the nature of public decisions and the need for transparent
accountability in public decision making under uncertainty
and amid value conflict mean that the analytical coherence
provided by the stochastic Bayesian decision analytic ap-
proach, drawing on the outputs of Bayesian science, is
needed. Hence, if scientific researchers are to play the role
they should be playing in informing value-based decision
making, they need to see themselves also as 'guardians of
uncertainty', contributing to optimal decision making, by
ensuring that their current posterior distributions on rel-
evant parameters are made available for decision making,
irrespective of the state (or results) of the knowledge-gen-
erating (certainty-seeking) research. So long as the funda-
mental distinction between Classical 'Hard' Science and
Bayesian Science is strictly maintained, and always publicly
stressed, both functions can be performed well by the same
person or group - and what ought to be complementary
aspects of scientific careers thereby safeguarded.
In developing its theme, the paper distinguishes the actors
employing different technologies in terms of the focus of
the technology (knowledge, values, choice); the 'home
base' mode of their activity on the cognitive continuum
of varying analysis-to-intuition ratios; and the underlying
value judgements of the activity (e.g., error loss functions
and time discount rates). It is argued that those who pro-
pose any principle of decision making other than the banal
'Best Principle', for example the 'Precautionary Principle',
are properly interpreted as advocates seeking to have their
own value judgements and their own preferences regarding
mode location apply. Thus they are fully entitled to do, like
all of us, but only as advocates. The task for accountable de-
cision makers, and their supporting technologists, must be
to determine the best course of action under the universal
conditions of uncertainty and value difference/conflict.
TECHNOLOGIES
Technologies are ways of doing things. If we want to do
something, we have to use a technology. If we want to in-
crease our knowledge or represent the current state of our
knowledge and uncertainty, we have to use a Knowledge
Technology (KT). If we want to establish our values, we
have to use a Valuation Technology (VT). If we want to
make a decision - and this will require somehow integrat-
ing the current state of our knowledge and our values - we
have to use a Decision Technology (DT). Finally, though
of relatively little concern here, if we want to communi-
cate information about anything (knowledge, values, deci-
sions), we have to use an Information Technology (IT).
All these tasks can be - and are in practice - tackled at
most modes on the Cognitive Continuum of changing
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Analysis-to-Intuition (A-I) ratios (Fig. 1). But obviously
very strong views are held about where they should be
taekled, especially in relation to Decision Technologies
when the decisions are either public/societal (as in public
health) or agent-involving (as in clinical medicine) [1].
Very briefly, Cognitive Continuum theory suggests that
we have two basic types of cognition available to us
- analysis and intuition. Contrary to thinkers who see
these as binary and exclusive, Hammond [2] suggests that
we think of them as being combined, and combinable, in
different ratios along a continuum running from highly
intuitive at one extreme to highly analytical at the other.
Broadly speaking, as we increase the A-I ratio, the defini-
tion of concepts, the specification of relationships and the
measurement of magnitudes becomes more explicit and
precise - and 'transparent' in current parlance. While the
continuum is indeed a continuum, broad ranges can be
conceptualised as relatively distinct modes of cognition.
Six seem sufficient to locate the main types of inquiry
and practice. It is important to emphasise that there is no
implication that the higher the A-I ratio the better, nor the
reverse, so that the numbering scheme and orientation in
the diagram has no significance in this respect. The qual-
ity dimension emphasises that both analysis and intuition
may vary in quality in any particular instantiation.
KNOWLEDGE TECHNOLOGIES
We have two ultimate aims involving knowledge - possess-
ing it and using it. We want to know 'the truth' and we want
to make good decisions. While different definitions follow
from these different aims, in both cases we are interested
in the nature of states of the world (both biophysical and
human), the processes that link them (especially 'causal'
links) and the events that change either the nature of the
states or the linking processes.
In pursuit of the former, Truth-Focused, aim we define
knowledge as 'the certain truth' - and only the certain
truth. This is the aim of the activity we will refer to as
'Hard' Science and suggest it usefully characterised as
a Truth-Focused Certainty-Seeking Knowledge Tech-
nology. It seeks to increase the stock of knowledge by
removing the uncertainties we have, especially about
causation. Only when all uncertainty is removed, and cer-
tainty achieved, is knowledge increased. There can be no
justification for compromising on standards for external
instrumental reasons (such as decision making). For this
reason 'Hard' Science has a zero time discount rate, as
indeed should all Truth-Focused technologies.
In pursuit of the latter, Decision-Focused, aim we define
knowledge as the extent to which we are not uncertain
about something at this (decisional) point in time. The
aim, and only aim, of the activity we will refer to as Bayes-
ian Science (a Decision-Focused Uncertainty Represent-
ing Knowledge Technology) is to represent that certainty/
uncertainty in the way that will best help make the best
decision now. Time limitation, dictated by the decision fo-
cus, is central to this activity and means that it will almost
always be necessary to accept only limited fulfillment of
'scientific standards'.
The best decision will obviously incorporate any relevant
certainties established by Truth-Focused Certainty-Seek-
ing Knowledge Technology, but these will invariably be
insufficient to determine a public decision, even if we were
to leave aside (as we can't) the necessary value inputs.
Moreover, the format of the output from a Truth-Focused
Certainty-Seeking Knowledge Technology will typically be
inappropriate for decision makers using an analytic Deci-
sion Technology.
In terms of the cognitive continuum, 'Hard' Science as
a Truth-Focused Certainty-Seeking Knowledge Technol-
ogy is undertaken at mode 1 in relation to physical and
biological objects and at mode 2 in relation to human be-
ings as assemblies of physical and biological elements (as
in most RCTs). Whether or not some relaxation of these
downward cut-offs is permitted in practice, there are clear
cut-offs in principle, not least to ensure that conventional
scientific standards have been met at the most rigorous
and transparent level - and hence be replicable.
On the contrary, Bayesian Science as an Decision-Focused
Uncertainty-Representing Knowledge Technology can
have no cut-off on the continuum since the best possible
representation of our current uncertainty in a particular
case may be generated at any mode. Bayesian Science is
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Fig. 2. Locating knowledge, valuation and decision technologies.
generally disposed to respect the 'hierarchy of evidence',
subject to this being extended to modes below mode 2
and any cut-off being eschewed. But there is no assump-
tion that scientific standards can be fully met within the
relevant time window and indeed the Truth-Focus implies
irrelevant value judgements about error costs. The 'home
base' of Bayesian Science is the middle (modes 3 and 4) of
the cognitive continuum.
So far, for expositional convenience in contrasting 'Hard'
Science and Bayesian Science, we have talked as if the for-
mer is the only Truth-Focused Certainty-Seeking Knowl-
edge Technology. But of course many within Western
cultures, as well as many non-Western ones, believe there
are other valid ways of truth seeking, especially in relation
to human beings and the human world.
Within what we will call 'the Humanities', the term 'under-
standing' may be used as often as, or instead of, 'knowl-
edge', but in terms of our framework we are still deahng
with Truth-Focused Certainty-Seeking Knowledge Tech-
nologies. These, however, are ones located at modes 5 and
6 - or even the non-cognitive mode 7 - at the opposite
end of the Cognitive Continuum to 'Hard' Science. Pro-
ponents of such ways of truth-seeking tend to employ an
upward cut-off, paralleling the downward cut-off of'Hard'
Science. The implication is that, above a certain Analysis-
to-Intuition ratio, and particularly in respect to concep-
tual precision and quantification, one cannot obtain 'true'
understanding or knowledge about people as people (as
distinct from biophysical entities) and the meanings they
attach to things (life, art, relationships, the self...).
Looking at the left hand column of Fig. 2, we now have
a picture in which the two dominant Truth-Focused
Certainty-Seeking Knowledge Technologies of our times
('Hard' Science and 'Judgement') are located at the ex-
tremes ofthe continuum. This leaves the middle modes as
the location of what we will call (for want of a better term
and to avoid 'Soft') 'Middle' Science. This embraces such
activities as 'observational' as opposed to 'interventional'
studies in the health sciences, descriptive 'modelling' in
various disciplines, and most of the empirical 'social sci-
ences'. Each of the three, for its own reasons, operates
a cut-off in relation to its neighbours, 'Middle' Science
being subject to cut-offs from each direction and often
suffering disparagement simultaneously from those in
'Hard' sciences and the typically qualitative judgemental
disciplines. However, its inhabitants often themselves
affirm these boundaries by stressing the importance of
avoiding both the Scylla of 'objectivity' (upwards in our
diagram) and the Charybdis of 'subjectivity' (downwards)
(in academic terms it is obvious that inter-disciplinary
disputes are often essentially about cut-off infractions, but
perhaps not so obvious that many intra-disciplinary fights
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in subjects such as economics and psychology are also
about where the discipline should be located in relation to
these boundaries).
The dominant Decision-Focused Uncertainty-Represent-
ing Knowledge Technology, Bayesian Science, also has
these middle modes as its home base, but has no cut-off
either upwards or downwards and draws from all depend-
ing on the case (see second column from left in Fig. 2).
VALUATION TECHNOLOGIES
In contrast to knowledge, it does not make sense to say
that we want to 'increase'Values, but there is much inter-
est in establishing the 'one true' set of values. Through the
centuries many individuals and groups have claimed to
have discovered 'the truth' in this respect and much of the
world's misery has followed from such 'discoveries'.
From our decisional point of view, however, the key issue
is the way the Value inputs are established at decision
time. Here we identify the dominant types of Valuation
Technology as Truth-Focused Principles Processing and
Decision-Focused Preference Weighting (see third col-
umn of Fig. 2).
In Truth-Focused Principles Processing values are held in
the form of general principles, usually a mixture of both
the deontological (rights and duties) and the utilitarian
(both act and rule), with the processing of these involving
a judicious discursive qualitative weaving - 'artful moral
dodging' in Morreim's [3] complimentary term. No formal,
explicit ranking or rating of principles is established in this
discourse, let alone any abstract quantitative trade-off of
one with another. The 'home base' of Truth-Focused Prin-
ciples Processing is therefore modes 5 and 6 - and in many
cases, it would seem, the non-cognitive mode 7.
In Decision-Focused Preference Weighting these prin-
ciples are translated/transformed into the aspirationally
coherent and quantitatively ranked and rated preferences
necessary for analytical decision making. Such preferences
necessarily reflect the trading-off of the competing claims
arising from different ethical principles and moral claims
and, in essence, involve the commutation of all the prin-
ciples into a single metric. Note that, for decision making.
it is not a question of whether this commutation is done,
but how it is done. It can be done non-transparently at the
largely intuitively modes (5 and 6), or much more trans-
parently at the analysis-to-intuition ratios that character-
ise the middle modes (3 and 4).
DECISION TECHNOLOGIES
We are now in a position to compare the two basic types of
Decision Technologies available.
The currently dominant DT used in public decision mak-
ing is located at modes 5 and 6. It is referred to here as
Taking Into Account and Bearing In Mind (TIABIM),
because these phrases are characteristic of the way their
decision process is described by those involved. Stereotyp-
ically TIABIM involves taking into account and bearing in
mind the outputs of Truth-Focused KTs ('Hard' Science
at modes 1 and 2, 'Judgement' at modes 5 and 6 and, with
distinctly less enthusiasm, 'Middle' Science at modes 3 and
4) together with the outputs of Truth-Focused Principles
Processing at modes 5 and 6. To accomplish the cognitive
'sleight of mind' involved in such cross-technology and
cross-mode integration Taking Into Account and Bearing
In Mind requires the use of concepts that are non-op-
erational and implicitly confound knowledge and values.
'Risk', when used, as it typically is in TIABIM discourse,
other than as a simple synonym for probability or disutil-
ity, is a leading example. 'Safe' and 'dangerous' and their
various cognates are others. We have argued at length
elsewhere why the 'Risk Approach' is incompatible with
analytically coherent public decision making and should
be replaced by the Decision Analytic one [4].
The contrast with the main alternative DT, Stochastic
Bayesian Decision Analysis, could not be starker. Mode
5/6-based TIABIM reluctantly makes some use of Truth-
Focused inputs from the middle modes ('Middle' Sci-
ence) but relatively little use of Decision-Focused inputs
from Bayesian Science based in the 'middle modes' (in
the UK the National Institute for Clinical Excellence is
taking the first faltering steps towards greater use of such
inputs within its increasingly analytic decision technol-
ogy). On the contrary. Stochastic Bayesian Decision
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Analysis is not only based in the middle modes itself, but
achieves its coherence by using, as its inputs, the outputs
of a middle mode-based Decision-Focused Uncertainty-
Representing KT (such as the probabilities generated by
Bayesian Science) and a middle mode-based Decision-
Focused Preference Weighting VT (such as utilities and
QALYs).
To many scientists and large numbers of the public,
'Hard' Science is the only valid Truth-focused Certainty-
seeking KT. The problem with this position is that when
it comes to decision making the results (or lack of results)
obtained by 'Hard' Science can be incorporated into de-
cision making only when the DT is located at mode 5 or
6. And in fact the same applies to the outputs of all types
of Truth-Focused KT - they can only be used within
a TIABIM-type DT. Because it is Decision-Focused,
Bayesian Science is the only appropriate KT if we wish to
adopt a middle mode DT
It is, of course, no part of the role of the analyst, as ana-
lyst, to influence the decision maker's mode of decision
making. But the responsible and accountable, and indeed
ethical, public decision maker would be well advised not
to assume that they are able (in TIABIM mode) to out-
perform the recommendations emerging from a model-
ling exercise (e.g., a SBDA) merely because they can
point to flaws and limitations in the model. Especially
not when they are making a totally irrelevant comparison
with the output of a Truth-Focused Certainty-Seeking
Knowledge Technology. It hardly needs pointing out that
there is a considerable evidence that the implicit decision
models of the human decision makers involved in TIA-
BIM - usually committees of some sort - have flaws and
limitations. The real issue is accordingly the comparative
imperfection of these alternative decision technologies.
Failure to recognise and accept this leads to the endemic
phenomena of 'double standards' and the 'nirvana trap',
which involve applying standards of perfection to DTs,
particularly middle mode ones like Stochastic Bayesian
Decision Analysis, that one has no intention of apply-
ing to oneself (at mode 6) or in collaboration with one's
fellow decision makers (at mode 5). While it is socially
acceptable and almost mandatory to stress that it is es-
sential that the contents of a model are robust enough to
withstand critical scrutiny, it is much less acceptable to
suggest the same rigorous examination of the contents of
a decision maker.
The Decision-Focused inhabitants of the middle modes,
whether Bayesian Scientists, Preference Weighters or
Stochastic Bayesian Decision Analysts suffer the twin so-
cio-professional perils of 'living in the middle' of the con-
tinuum and insisting that decision making inputs should
be derived from Decision-Focused not Truth-Focused
technologies. Historically, the universal desire for cer-
tainty has led to the privileging of the two poles of the A-I
continuum, i.e., mode 1, where it was felt we could trust
the process of objective science, and mode 6, where it was
felt we could trust the personal authority of the individual
expert. Recently, growing disaffection with, and distrust
of, these extreme modes has led to greater willingness to
move inwards at both ends, to high quality mode 2 scien-
tific research processed by expert groups at mode 5 ('Evi-
dence-based ..." is the adjective now commonly applied to
this TIABIM-type DT, still making only slow advance rela-
tive to the traditional mode 6 DT of 'clinical/professional
judgement'). But there is still formidable reluctance and
hostility to any move further inwards to the middle modes
(4 and 3) that represent the most equal balancing of analy-
sis and intuition.
Why this reluctance? We suggest that, apart from mas-
sive vested material interests, it is because in the middle
of the continuum one actually maximises what we really
- psychologically and socio-psychologically - do not want
to know. In the middle we maximise uncertainty by expos-
ing all its sources as completely as possible and insisting
that all the uncertainties be dealt with explicitly, transpar-
ently and quantitatively, rather than denied or dealt with
implicitly, covertly and qualitatively, as is still substantially
the case at mode 5 (albeit less so than at mode 6). Equally,
in the middle we maximise the extent to which we are
confronted by the existence of incoherent values within
individuals and groups and value differences and conflicts
between individuals and groups (such as over uncertainty
preferences and time discount rates). In the middle we are
denied our denials.
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RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND THE BEST
PRINCIPLE
There are three clear research implications from the fore-
going argument, which, as with the argument itself, it is
only possible to present in broad outline here.
The first is that public funding for 'scientific' research
should require both types of science (Truth-Focused
and Decision-Focused) to be undertaken within any
project in order to ensure that the work yields maximum
benefits for ongoing decision making as well as for long-
term knowledge accumulation. If scientific researchers
are to play the role they should be playing in informing
value-based decision making, they need to see themselves
also as 'guardians of uncertainty', contributing to optimal
decision making by ensuring that their current posterior
distributions on relevant parameters are made available
for decision making, irrespective of the state or results of
the knowledge-generating (certainty-seeking) research.
Truth-Focused Certainty Seeking and Decision-Focused
Uncertainty Representation need to be accorded equal
status and respect. We need to recognise that the major
existing paradigms (the 'Hard' Science and the Bayesian)
are complementary not competitive, but very clearly dis-
tinguish the tasks for which each is appropriate and inap-
propriate. We do not need a new scientific paradigm.
The second is that serious 'scientific' research into the
value base of public decisions is as necessary as that into
the knowledge base and should be well (i.e., much better)
funded. The third, and the one on which we concentrate
for the present purpose, is that no research based on, or
directed towards, the 'precautionary' or any other such
decision principle is required. Resort to a Truth-Focused
decision principle such as the 'Precautionary Principle'
represents an ultimately doomed and expensive attempt
to avoid the pain of moving to the middle and dealing with
the issues involved through a Decision-Focused technol-
ogy located at the minimum analytical level necessary for
transparent and accountable public decision making.
The 'Best Principle' is the only decisional principle we
need; all others are diversions from, or deterrents to, the
systematic clarification and processing of uncertainties
and value differences - including especially risk prefer-
ences and time discount rates - that will be undertaken as
part of best practice Stochastic Bayesian Decision Analy-
sis. That analysis may well show that, using the preferred
inputs of some parties, the optimal course of action would
be to do what the Precautionary Principle would suggest
(if that can actually be determined!) - but that will be be-
cause we are following the Best Principle.
The Precautionary Principle is not to be seen as a special
case of the Best Principle merely because the latter will
sometimes lead to the same conclusion. The best course
of action may indeed be to (for example) stop all devel-
opment of some new technique or product. Or the best
course of action might be to go full steam ahead with it. Or
the best course of action might be to do any of the many
things in between these two extremes. But this will be es-
tablished by adopting the Best Principle. To see whether
being 'Precautionary' is the Best course of action, we have
to define operationally what being Precautionary involves
- which action/s is/are in line with the principle and which
isn't/aren't. In order to do that we will have to do an analy-
sis of the various possible courses of action. It follows that
we cannot decide how to be precautionary without doing
the same analysis that is necessary to identify the Best
course of action.
Since proponents of the Precautionary Principle are pre-
sumably suggesting that it will lead to the adoption of the
Best course of action (in the circumstances where they
urge its application) why do they not simply argue for the
Best Principle? Why, indeed, should anyone suggest that
we follow the Precautionary Principle instead of the Best
Principle? The only reason seems to be that people realise
that is it very difficult to set up a procedure that identifies
the Best course of action without moving to a Decision-
Focused DT in the middle modes. They prefer to try to
evade this task by convincing themselves that a principle
that can be enunciated at modes 5 and 6 is adequate. But
logically no other principle can outrank the Best Principle
and neither normatively nor politically can one see any
authority trying to justify not following it, if asked.
The Precautionary Principle may be seen most positively
if it is interpreted as a misguided attempt to overcome
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the limitations and biases of the 'Risk Approach'. It is
misguided because it fails to identify and address the key
pathologies at the heart of that approach - the mutually
supportive concepts of 'risk' and 'science-based policy'.
Advocacy of the Precautionary Principle results from
the confusion of Truth-Focused and Decision-Focused
technologies on the one hand and of Knowledge, Valua-
tion and Decision Technologies on the other. Despite its
grounding in a highly analytical ('Hard' Science) view of
what constitutes knowledge, it is, ironically, only defen-
sible and implementable at a largely intuitive mode of
decision making.
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